Fragen? Antworten! Siehe auch: Alternativlos
Wie sich rausstellt: Ja, gibt es.
In addition to poorly run and deficient drills, many of the ship’s crew had not donned Self- Contained Breathing Apparatus (SCBA) in over a year, did not know how to use or activate Aqueous Film Forming Foam (AFFF) or halogenated hydrocarbon (Halon) firefighting systems, and were unaware of where to locate and use Emergency Escape Breathing Apparatus (EEBA).
Ich weiß, was Sie jetzt denken! Macht ja nichts, holt man halt die Feuerwehr vom Land zu Hilfe! Die sind geschult!There was no “map of the ship” (Fire Control Plan as required by IMO SOLAS convention) available to shoreside firefighters when they arrived at Pier 2 at the San Diego Navy Base to assist in the firefighting effort. And there were no fire standpipes on the pier to supply firefighting water.
Ja gut, macht ja nichts. Wird nicht heiß genug, dass der Stahl schmilzt und das ganze Schiff absäuft.As the fire aboard the 844 ft LOA, 27,000-ton Wasp Class Amphibious Assault Ship grew, temperatures reached over 1400 degrees F, melting her aluminum internal superstructure.
Oh. Aluminium. Verstehe.Naja gut, aber mehr als das können sie ja unmöglich verkackt haben.
Mismatched hose threads, lack of compatible radios and common frequencies, inability to locate the fire, inability to provide firefighting water, no SCBA refilling capability, portable pumps inoperable, dead batteries in equipment, inability to accurately account for all crew, inability to take correct draft readings (required for stability calculations), not accounting for free surface effect, and a “leadership vacuum”. These are just a few of the issues identified in the US Navy’s report.
Öhm. Und DIE machen sich Sorgen um Nordkorea?!?